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tax rules and inflation on the size and allocation of the capital stock
with particular emphasis on the role of owner—occupied housing. The analysis
is developed in the framework of an economy that is in equilibrium and
in which a constant fraction of disposable income is saved. In thismodel,
I show that, with current U.S. tax laws, an increase inthe rate of in-
flation reduces the equilibrium amount of business capital employed in
the economy and raises the amount of housing capital. The analysis also
shows that a higher rate of inflation lowers the real net—of—tax rate
of return to the provider of business capital. In a richer model than
the current one, i.e., in a model in which the rate of personal saving
was an increasing function of the net rate of return, a higher inflation
rate would therefore lower the rate of saving.
The present analysis also shows that permitting firms to depreciate
investments more rapidly for tax purposes increases the accumulations of
business capital but that, unless firms are permitted to expense all in-
vestment immediately, an increase in inflation continues to depress the
accumulation of business capital.
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For nearly two decades, the United States haspursued a series of
short—run policies that have increased therateof inflation and sustained it at
a high level. The rate of increase of the generalpricelevel (as measured by
theGNP deflator) rose from less than 2 percenta year in the early 1960's to
more than 8percenta year in the late l970s. The expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies began in the earlyi960sas an attempt to lower the
unemploymentrate and expand the level ofoutput. Easy money, lower tax rates
oncapital income, and specific incentives for business investmentwere combined
withthe aim of stimulating investment and thereby,through the traditional
multiplier process, reduc:Lng unemployment. Although the rate ofinflationbegan
to rise, many economists argued that "movingup the iillips curve" tohigher
inflation and lower unemployment represented a desirable tradeoff. Then came
thedecision by President Johnson to expand both the Vietnam War andhis Great
Society programs. He insisted on doing so without a tax increase but withan
easy money policy aimed at keeping interest rates from rising. This moved the
inflation rate up sharply to more than five percentas the 1910's began.
In the l910's, inflationarymonetary and fiscal policies continued to
bepursued despite a lack of agreement on the rationale for those policieseven
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among the prevailing economists of thatdecade. In effect, these economists and
the politicians agreed on the treatment of the econonr eventhough they
disagreed about the proper diagnosis of its economiccondition. First, there
were those who continued to believe in a long—runPhillips curve trade—off be-
tween inflation and unemployment. They advocated expansionarypolicy in the
hope of reducing unemployment permanently evenif that meant accepting a higher
inflation rate. Second, there were those who recognized that no long—runtrade-
off exists but who misjudged how high the noninflationaryunemployment rate had
become because of changes in the demographic structureof the labor force and in
the transfer programs that encouraged higher unemployment.They advocated
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies because theybelieved that the econorrvi
wasstill operating with "too much unemployment." Finally,there were those who
correctly perceived that the econonvr was at orbelow thenoninflationary
unemploymentrate but whoresisted a tightening ofmonetaryand fiscal policy
because they were unwilling to pay the price in higherunemployment for slowing
the rise in inflation or reducing its level.
In this waytheeconorrr drifted to higher and higherrates of
inflation.1 Although some of the year to year changes in inflation were
unexpected, the general level and even some ofthe upward drift clearly
came to be anticipated. For more than adecade now, a major debate among
American macroeconomists has been about whethersuch anticipated inflation has
The OPEC price shocks played a significant partin this process but do not
alter the basic story that I have told above.For more extensive accounts,
see Blinder (1979), Eckstein (1978),Feldstein (l98la), and Gordon (1981).—3—
any effects on the real econonr. At least since Milton Friedman's(1968)presi-
dential address, economists have recognized that expected inflation isperfectly
neutral in a simplified econoimj with flexible prices, inelasticmoney demand and
notaxes. Subsequent research by Barro (l97), Lucas(1972), Sargent and
Wallace(1975)and others has refined this idea and emphasized the corresponding
neutrality of expected changes in the stock of money.1
The important question, however, is whether the neutrality of antici-
pated changes in money and in the price level are relevant to the actualeconoIrr
in which we live. James Tobin (1965) emphasized that even fully anticipated
inflation is not neutral because the demand for money balances varies inversely
with the nominal interest rate and therefore with the expected rate of
inflation. An increase in inflation caused by a more rapid growth ofmoney
would therefore raise the capital intensity of the economy by inducing house-
holds to substitute real capital for money in their portfolios. Stanley Fischer
(1979) has recently examined the lead and lag patterns by which expectedchanges
in the money stock can alter the capital stock and real output through the Tobin
money—capital substitution effect. Although this portfolio substitution process
is analytically correct, it is generally agreed that the magnitude of the Tobin
effect is extremely small.2
By contrast, the interaction of inflation and the tax rulcs can have
very substantial effects on the incentive to save and on the relative returns to
See also the papers and discussion in Fischer (1919).
2 See section 1 of thispaper, especially page 1, for a discussion of why
the Tobin effect is empirically too small to matter.-4-
different types of investments. In Feidstein (1916) I examined the way inwhich
the tax—inflation interaction could lower total capital formation by reducing
the incentive to save. Then in Feldstein (1980a) I showed how thetax—inflation
interaction would encourage individual investors to substitute interest bearing
government debt for real capital in their portfolios and therebyreduce the real
capital intensity of the econorrw. The present paperextends this analysis to
examine how inflation diverts capital from plant and equipment toowner—occupied
housing.
Under present U.S. tax law,2 an individual who owns his ownhouse way
deduct the interest payment in calculating taxable income anddoes not pay tax
onthe implicit rental income provided (in kind) by hishouse. In addition, the
capital gains on owner—occupied housing are virtuallyuntaxed. Because nominal
interest payments are deductible, the tax advantages of investmentin owner—
occupied housing rise substantially with inflation. If,for example, the
mortgage interest rate is 4 percent in the absenceof inflation, an individual
with a rginal tax rate of 40 percent pays a2.4 percent real net rate of
interest. If an expected inflation rate of 8 percent raisesthe interest
rate to 12 percent, the real net interest rate falls tominus 0.8 percent. The
I have previously discussed the way that inflation and taxrules combine to
achieve this distortion in Feidstein (198Gb, 1980d) buthave not previously
presented a formal model. For other analyses ofthe way that the tax—
inflation interaction affects the demand for residential capital,see
Rendershott (1979, 1980) ,llendershottand Hu (1919), Hendershott and
Shilling(1980),Poterba (1980) and Summers (1981).
2I.e., the law as of July 1981.—5—
value of the tax deduction of nominal interest rates rises from 1.6percent to .8
percent.
In contrast, the tax burden on business capital rises when there is
inflation. Under existing U.S. tax rules, inflation affects the taxationof
business capital in three important ways.First,because of the "historic cost"
approach to calculating the cost of production, a higher rate of inflation
reduces the real value of depreciation allowances and understates the costs of
replacing the goods withdrawn from inventory. Second, the owners of the equity
of business firms pay capital gains tax on the rise in the nominal value of the
capital stock. And, third, the firm gets to deduct nominal interest payments
(thereby understating its taxable profits) but the creditors iastpay tax on
nominal interest receipts (thereby overstating their taxable income). Since the
effective tax rate on the reduced corporate income is very close to the effec-
tive tax rate on the increased creditor income (Feldstein and Summers, 1980),
this third effect is very small. On balance, inflation therefore raises the
tax burden on the income from business investment.
Since the stock of housing capital is about i4 percent of the stock of
nonresidential capital1- an incentive to shift capital from plant and equipment
to housing can have a significant effect on the amount of plant and equipment in
the econony. The ratio of net investment in residential capital to net invest—
1 This excludes land andincludes inventories as well as fixed capital. Owner—
occupied housing accounts for )-r2 percent of fixed capital alone. The data
on capital stocks and inventories are from theFederalReserve Board's
Balance Sheets of the U.S. Economy.—6—
ment in plant and equipment rose from 52 percent in the last half of the 1960's
to i6 percent in the last half of the 1910's. In Feldstein (1980e) ,Ipresented
econometric evidence that the interaction of tax rules and inflation reduced the
incentive to invest in plant and equipment and that this can explain most of the
variation in the share of GNP devoted to such investment during the past three
decades.
The present paper analyses the effect of the interaction between tax
rules and inflation on the size and allocation of the capital stock with par-
ticular emphasis on the role of owner—occupied housing. The analysis is deve-
loped in the framework of an economy that is in equilibrium and in which a
constant fraction of disposable income is saved. In this model, I show that,
with current U.S. tax laws, an increase in the rate of inflation reduces the
equilibrium amount of business capital employed in the econoirr and raises the
amount of housing capital. The analysis also shows that a higher rate of infla-
tion lowers the real net—of—tax rate of return to the provider of business capi-
tal. In a richer model than the current one, i.e., in a model in which the rate
of personal saving was an increasing function of the net rate of return, a
higher inflation rate would therefore lower the rate of saving.
The present analysis also shows that permitting firms to depreciate
investments more rapidly for tax purposes increases the accumulations of busi-
ness capital but that, unless firms are permitted to expense allinvestment
immediately, an increase in inflation continues to depress the accumulationof
business capital.—7—
The model considered in this paper is avery simple one. To keep the
analysis tractable and informative, I ignore several issues that I havecon-
sideredinearlier papers: changes in the saving rate; changes in the demand
for money; government debt; and the mixture of debt andequity in corporate
finance.1 A modelcannot be a complete picture of reality but shouldhelp to
elucidatesomeparticular aspect of reality.
Onefinal pointshouldbe emphasized before turning to the formal
analysis.Because the relation between inflation and capital formationdepends
onthe fiscal structure of the econorr, the specific distorting effect ofinfla-
tion is not a universal constant but differsamong countries and even within the
same country from time to time.
1. A GrowjnEconom with Inflation and Housin
The simplest framework within which to examine the effect of inflation
on the composition of the capital stock is an economy with two sectors. The
corporate business sector produces a general good that can be used for both con-
sumption and investment. The unincorporated household sector produces the ser-
vices of the owner—occupied housing stock. The populationgrows exogenously in
this economy at a constant rate (n) and the labor force is a fixed fraction of
the population. Labor is employed only in the production of thegeneral good;
housing services are proportional to the stock of housing and are produced
without labor.2
SeeFeldstein (1976, 1980)andFeldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1978).
2 The model alsoignores the land used in housing. In the current framework,
inflation would raise the relative price of land.—8—
The Business Sector
If the general good is produced with constant returns to scale, the
techno1or can be described by a production function that relates output per
employee (y) to the capital stock per employee used in this sector (k):
(1.1) y =f(k).
For simplicity, output is measured net of depreciation and all technical
progress is ignored.
The pretax rate of return on corporate capital is f'. In the absence
of inflation, corporations pay tax at rate tonthis return to capital. The net
of tax returns on the marginal investment, (l—i)f', mast in equilibrium be equal
to the firms' net cost of funds. The analysis is greatly simplified by assuming
that all marginal investments are financed by debt.1 On these funds, firms pay
interest rate i. Since interest expenses are deducted in calculating a firrnts
taxable income, the net cost of borrowed funds is (l—r)i and the firm's
equilibrium condition is (l—'r)f' (l—T)i or just f' =i.
Itis worth noting that the analysis of this paper could be done
equally easily for an economy without any debt finance. In such an economy,
firms would use only equity finance and homeowners would have no mortgages. The
same basic results about the allocation of capital would be obtained, indicating
that the fundamental issue is the inflation—induced rise in the relative taxation of
business income and not the deductibility of nominal interest payments on
mortgages.
1The rationale for all "debt at the margin" finance is developed in Stiglitz
(1913 )anda model of growth equilibriumwith such finance is presented in
Feldstein(1916). Morerealistically,the costs of debt and equity funds
dependon a firm's debt—equity ratios see Gordon and Malkiel(1981)and
Feldstein,Green and Sheshinski (191b, 1979).—9—
Ifthere is inflation and the price level rises at a constant rate, it,
thenominal pretax rate of return on capital is f' +it.Ifinflation did not
alter the measurement of real taxable profits, the tax liability per unit of
capital (ignoring for a moment the tax treatment of debt) would be if'andthe
resulting nominal after—tax rate ofreturnwould be (i—i)f'+ it.Infact,
withthe tax accounting rules that have prevailed in the United States, infla-
tion causes taxable profits to increase relative to real profits. Both historic
cost depreciation and the use of first—in—first—out inventory accounting cause
an understatement of the true cost of production and therefore an overstatement
of taxable profits.1 As an approximation, the increase in taxable income per
unit of capital can be written as a constant rrultiple of the inflation rate, Air,
perunit of capital.2The additional tax is thus iXir. The nominal rate of
return to the corportion net of tax is therefore (l—r)f' + it —itAit.
Sincethe nominal interest rate is deducted in calculating taxable
income, the net of tax cost of borrowed funds is (l—T)i. The equilibrium con-
dition that requires equating the nominal net returns on the marginal unit of
capital to the net cost of funds therefore implies
(1.2) (1—r)f'+(1—tA)it (1—T)i.
If depreciation schedules permit tax depreciation that is faster than econo-
mic depreciation, taxable profits in the absence of inflation will be less
than true profits. The increase in real taxable profits caused by infla-
tion may leave taxable profits greater or less than true profits. What mat-
ters is the change in the size of this difference, i.e., profits relative to
realprofits, and not the sign of the difference.
2See Auerbach (1979) for an explicit derivation of the relation between it,ft
n,the true rate of depreciation and the increase in taxable income caused
by historic cost depreciation. Feldstein (1980c) discusses the additional
contribution of FIFO inventory accounting. For the United States, a value
of A =0.50is a reasonable approximation with the tax laws in effect in
the late 1970's.—10—
Before proceeding to discuss the housing sector, it is interesting to
note that equation 1.2 implies
1—tX
(1.3) i =fi+ —_____ 11
1—'t
Incontrast to the traditional conclusion of Irving Fisher that the nominal
interest rate rises point for point with the rate of inflation, equation 1.3
shows that, for a fixed real marginal product of capital, the rise in the
interest rate reflects the tax deductibility of nominal interest and the
mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits. With economic depre-
ciation and no artificial inventory profits, A =0and di/dir =11(1—i).With
existing depreciation and inventory rules, 0 <A<1and 1 <di/diT<
Ifthe individuals who provide capital to the business sector pay tax
at rate 0 on nominal interest income, the real net—of—tax interest that they
earn is (1—8) i—it. From equation 1.3 it follows that
(1.4) (1—0)i -= (1—o)f'+t—8-(1—0)tX]
1—I
The impact of inflation on the real net return to lenders depends on two things.
First, t—0 reflects the difference between the advantage of deducting nominal
interest payments at the corporate level and the disadvantage of paying tax on
nominalinterest income at the personal level. Second, (l—0)tX reflects the
additional tax paid at the corporate level because of the mismeasurement of
depreciation and inventory costs. For any marginal personal income tax rate
greater than 30 percent, i.e, for 8.30, the coefficient of itisnegative.2
1 The expression is more complex when firms use equity as well as debt in
marginal finance. It is important to emphasize that these expressions for
di/dit are partial equilibrium relations that assume f' fixed.
2 Empirical research by Feldstein and Summers (1980) showed that for the
econonr as a whole including financial institutions (i.e., not justfor
potential homeowners), T —8is approximately zero.—11—
The Housing Sector
The owner—occupied housing sector uses capital but no labor to produce
housing services. Since in the long—run capital can irove freely between the two
sectors,the equilibrium price of a unit of housing capital is the same as the
price of a unit of business capital which in turn is the price of a unit ofthe
general goodJ The price of housingservices therefore depends on the cost of
owningone unit of housing capital and of maintaining that capital.
More specifically, for each dollar of housing capital the individual
paysor foregoes net interestof (l_O)1.2 Local property tax, maintenance,
depreciation and a standard risk premium add an additional net cost of z per
unit of housing capital.3 Since the value of net housing capital rises at the
rate of inflation, the real net cost of owning and maintaining a unit of housing
capital is:
(1.5) r =(l—O)i+z—'i
Notethat r is thus the implicit rental cost of a unitofowner—occupied housing
capital.
The demand for housing capital by individual home owners reflects both
thedemand for housing services and the demand for housing capital as a port—
By contrast, in the short run the stocks of housing capital and business
capital are given and equilibrium must be achievedby changes in the prices ofthese capital stocks. See Poterba (1980) and Summers (1981).
2This assumes that individuals borrow and lend at the same interest rate.It
also reflects the U.S. tax rule that permits individuals to deduct mortgage
interest payments in the calculation of taxable income.
3I say "net" cost because local property taxes are a deductible expense in
calculating individual taxable income. By "standard risk premium" I mean
the premium for a "standard" or "basic" amount of housing capital; the risk
premimiu.m may be a function of the amount of housing capital in a way
specified below.—12—
folio asset. Since I have assumed that the amount of housing service is propor—
tiorial to the housing stock, it is not necessary to distinguish thedemandfor
services from the demand for a portfolio asset. Instead, the demand for housing
capital can beconsidereddirectly with its determinants reflecting both the
portfolio and service characteristics. The simplest such specification is
(1.6) h =
whereIi is the housing capital stock per employee and '<o.-
In terms of the demand for housing services, equation i.6 implies that
the relative demand for housing services and for other goods varies inversely
with the implicit rental price of housing. A more general specification would
make the demand for housing a function of real income and of wealth. Within the
current paper, however, the equilibrium values of real income and wealth remain
constant except for changes in the efficiency of resource allocation. If the
initialcondition of the econonr is regarded as one of optimal resource alloca-
tion, the changes inresourceallocation that result fromasmall increase in
the rate of inflation do not change real income to a first order approximation.
A large change in inflation would, however, reducereal income. Similarly, a
smallincrease in inflation would reduce real incomeif, inthe initial con-
dition, non—neutral tax rules cause there to be too much housing capital.A
reduction in real income would cause individuals to consume less housing and
Since theothergoods represent the numeraire, r is also therentalprice of
housing relative to the price of other goods.this would partially offset theinflation--inducedtransfer of capital from the
businesssectorto housingiThereis •the further effect that a reduction in
realincome reduces saving and therefore the total capitalstock; that effect is
explicitly included in the modeL,
Even in the restricted form of equation 1.6, the demand forhousing
capital as an asset influences the form of the demand function, .Inpar-
ticular, since each individual must own the housing capital that produces his
housingservices, an increase in the consumption of housing services beyond some
level involves increasing portfolio risk.2 This impliesthat, for high values
of h, the demand for housing capital is less responsive to theimplicit rental
price than would be true if individuals did not have to own their housing
capital.3 en when the implicit rental price wouldotherwise be zero or nega-
tive, riskconsiderations li.mit the demand for housing ca1Dital)
Shifting one unit of capital from the businesssector to housing reduces
realincome by the difference between the real marginal products of capital
inthe two sections and this income effect reduces the demand for housing
capital by the marginal propensity to own housing capital as a function of
real income, The real marginal product difference is less than f' which is
approximately 0.12 in the United States. The marginal housing—to—income
ratio is less than three. Thus this real income effect offsets at most
about one—third of any shift of capital from the business to housing
sectors.
2
This is particularly true when the acquisition of housing capital is
financed by borrowing.
3The model assumes that all housing is owner—occupiedwhen inreality about 15
percentofthe housing capital stock is owner occupied. The tax advantages
and other aspects of home ownership outweigh risk considerations at most
incomelevels. The •tax advantge of home ownership is increased by inflation
since rental property is adversely affected by historic cost depreciation
rules.
I believe that the risks associated with increased investment in housing
capital kept the price of houses from rising even faster in the 1910's. For
many individuals with high marginal tax rates, the implicit rental cost of
housing was then zero or negative.-lit-
TheDemand for Money
Money plays two quite distinct roles in a model of equilibrium
growth. First, the exogenously given rate of growth of the nominal money
stock determines the rate of inflation. This follows directly from the fact
that the stock of real money balances per employee imist remain constant in
equilibrium growth since real income per employee, real assets per employeeand
the rate of interest are all constant.1 If real money balances per employee
are to remain constant, the rate of growth of the nominal moneystock (M/M) must
equal the rate of growth of prices plus the rate of' growth ofthe labor force:
(i.7) =if+ fl•
M
The second role of money is as an asset that absorbs savings and
thereby reduces the equilibrium size of the real capital stock,k +h.Tobin
(1965)has emphasizedthat an increase in inflation, by increasing the real cost
of holding money balances, encourages households to economize onreal money
balances and therefore to devote a larger share of their wealth toreal capital
formation. The importance of this substitution effect depends on thesize of
the stock of "outside money" (i.e., money that does not represent aliability of
any private entity) relative to total wealthand on the elasticity of money
demand with respect to the nominal rate of interest. The monetary base, a
reasonable measure of the stock of outside money,2 was only $160 billionin 1980
1If there is technical progress, the statement is true with "employee"
interpretedas "effective employee".
2 Itould bewrong•to include inthemeasure of outside money any interest
bearing government debt since the market interest ratewould adjust with
inflation. Tobin' sprocedureof combining money andgovernment debt is
therefore misleading; see Feldstein(1980a) foramodel that distinguishes
money,government debt, and private real capital.or less than 3 percent ofthetotal stock at' private wealth. Since all esti-
mates of the interest elasticity of money demand are substantiallylessthan one,
it is clear that even major changes in the nominalrateof interest wouldhave
verylittle effect on the fraction of savings devoted to real capital formation.
I shall therefore ignore the interest elasticity of demandcompletelyand write
thedemand for real money balances per employee (m) as a constant fraction (u)
ofthe corresponding real capital assets:
(1.8) m ii(k +h).
Public and Private Consumption
Thegovernment consumes a fraction (i) of real national income and
households consume a fraction (1—o) of real disposable income. National income
consists of the output of the businesssector plus the output of the owner—
occupied housing sectorJ To combine these two products, I assurie a constant
relative price of housing services, i.e., an implicit rental of p per unit of
0 housingcapital; national income per employee is thus y +ph. Real govern-
ment spending per employee is
(1.9) ;=y(y+ph).
This ignores the value of the services of the stock of money, an omission
that has no qualitative effect on the resultsof this analysis.
2The value of p is the initial rental price of housing services. A small
change in the rental price changes real income to the extent that (1) it
reallocates capital between h and k and (b) the marginal product of business
capital differs from p. That is, the change in real income is f'dk +pdh.
It would be incorrect to include a term of the form Mr in evaluating the
change in real income since dr represents either a change inthe implicit
pricethat individuals pay themselves on housing or a change in the ax con-
sequences of home ownership that would macrely be offset by a change in other
taxes.—16—
Disposable income may be defined as national income minus both taxes
paid (t) and the loss in real money balances caused by inflation (Jim).1 Thus
consumption per employee is
(1.10) c =(i—a)(y +ph—t—¶m).
Since the government deficit equals the increase in the stock of money balances
(g—t =(Ir+n)rn),equation 1.10 can be rewritten:
(1.11) c (1—a) (y +ph—g+nm).
This formulation, which is essentially due to Tobin (1965), assumes that house-
holds regard their increase in real balances as a component of disposable income
even though the real resources available to households (i.e., the maximum
feasible consumption) are only y +ph—g.2The amount that households save,
including the amount that is saved in the form of increased real money balances
is therefore
(1.12) s =a(y +ph—g+rim)
or, using 1.9 to substitute for g,
(1.13) s =a[(l—y)(y+ph)+mimi
1 Taxes include the taxes on capital income from corporations and industries
and an additional nondistorting tax. Changes in tax revenue that result from
changes in inflation are offset by changes in the nondistorting taxto keep
total tax revenue unchanged. If the offsetting change in other sources of
tax revenue were in a distortionary tax, the effect of inflation on real
income would be more couplex than the current analysis indicates. See
Feldstein (1916) for a discussion of this issue.
2 Ignoring run in 1.10 or sm in 1.9 would not change any of the qualitative
results.—17—
Growth Equilibrium
Realsavings per employee are divided into the increase of real busi-
ness capital per employee (K/N) ,theincrease of real housiqg capital per
employee (H/N), and the increase of real nney balancesper employee (Hip) IN):




Insteady—state equilibrium, all three stocks grow at the rate as the popu-
lation, implying that
(1.15) =n(k+ h+m).
Combining1.2 and i.4 gives the basic equation of growth equilibrium:
(i.16) [(l-y)(y+ph)+nm1 =n[k+h+m].
Using 1.8 to substitute for is, 1.6 to substitute for h, and 1.1 to substitute
for y, equation 1.16 can be rewritten
(1.17) [ (l-)(f+p) +n(k+) In{k ++ (k+) I
Recall thatis a function of r and that equation 1.5 shows this
implicitrental price to be r (l—O)i—z—it.Equation 1. showsthatthe
households'real net interest rate is given by(1—O)i-it(1—0)1'÷ x
where x ={T—0-.(l—0)TXJ/(1_T).Thus
(1.18) =[(i-o)'+xii + z].
If1.18 isused to substitute forin (1. 17) ,it; prcvides an equation-.18—
thatdetermines the stock of business capital as a function of the inflation
rate and the tax rules.
Disequilibrium Adjustments
The next section uses equations 1.11 and i.i8toexamine the
equilibrium effects of changes in the rate of inflation and the tax rules.
The complex expressions that result are readily interpreted in terms of the
disequilibrium adjustments of the capital stock. This permits determining the
directionsof equilibrium change without having to specify numerical values for
individual parameters.
Twovery plausible disequilibrium adjustment assumptions willbe made.
First,the Net Adjustment Assumption: an increase in either type of capital
stock per employee above its equilibrium value causes total wealth per employee
todecline:
(1.19) d(k +h+m) < 0
dk
and
(1.10) d(k +h+m) —<0
dh
Equation 1,19 is satisfied if, when k exceeds its equilibrium value,k falls and
the other types of wealth (housing plus real money balances) do not increase by
an even greater amount. Second, the Partial Adjustment Assumption:when the
stok of business capital per employee exceeds its equilibrium value, thetotal
wealth per employee will decline even if housingwealthper employee is held
constant:—19--
(1.21) a (k +h+m) <0
Sincethe fall in k (i.e., k<0) is likely to raise the housing stock, holding
housing constant should make it easier to satisfy the condition that a positive
pertubation of k causes total wealth to decline. In this sense, 1.21 is a
weaker assumption than 1.19 and 1.20.
2. Effects of Changes in Inflation
We are now in a position to examine the effect of inflation on the
capital intensity of the business sector, on the consumption of housing ser-
vices, and on the real net return to savers. Before beginning the forrnaj. deri-
vation of these effects, it is useful to consider the general logic of theprocess.
A higher rate of inflation reduces the after tax profitability of
investment because the tax accounting procedures for dealing with depreciation
and inventories raise the effective tax rate. This lower after—tax profitability
means that firms can pay only a lower real net rate of return to the creditors
who supply their capital.
The net return to the suppliers of business capital is also affected
by the fact that firms deduct nominal interest payments and that lenders pay tax
on nominal interest receipts. This matters, however, only to the extent that
the tax rates of borrowers and lenders are different.
Onbalance, inflation lowers the real net rate of return and therefore
reduces the implicit rental cost ofhousing.This in turn raises the consump-
tionofhousing services relative to the output of other goods. The present
sectionwill now show explicitly that thisreduces the equilibrium amount of—20—
business capital per employee and therefore the productivity of the labor force.
The decrease in productivity and the reallocation of production to housing also
lowers the real income per capita. Although the analysis takes the saving rate
(a) as fixed, the reduction in the real net rate of return implies that the
saving rate in a more general model would probably also be reduced, thereby
further decreasing the capital intensity of production.
The equilibrium growth condition of equation 1.17 can be rewritten by
collecting terms as:
(2.1) a(1—y)f +[anll—n(l+i)]k+a((i—y)p+nij—n(1+i)]=0
Using equation 1.18 forand totally differentiating 2.1 with respect to k and
ifyields:
(2.2) {a(1_y)f'+Iant.i—n(l+ll)ldk
+[a[(1—y)p+np] — n(1+)]'[(l—O)f"dk + xd] = 0




The effect of inflation on equilibrium capital intensity can now bewritten:
(2.5) dk = —___
dii
The appendix shows that Q1 is equal to the derivativeof the rate of
change of total wealth per employee with respect to a divergencebetween—21--
theactual business capital per employee and its equilibrium value:
Qi =d(k+h+m).The net adjustment assumption of equation 1.19 implies
<0.The appendix also shows that Q2isequal to the derivative of the
rate of change of total capital per employee with respect to a divergence bet-
ween the housing capital per employee and its equilibrium value: Q2=
d(k+h+m).The net adjustment of equation 1.20 implies Q2< 0.
Sincehousing consumption varies inversely with the implicit rental
cost of housing (i.e., since j' < 0), the sign of dk/dii isthesame as the sign
of x =[T—0—(i—0)TA]/(i—T).As I noted above, with realistic values of T and A,
x<0for any00.30 and therefore dk/dir < 0.
Since a higher rate of inflation unambiguouslyreducesthe real
equilibrium capital intensity of the business sector, it increases the pretax
real rate of return (f'). The net of tax real rate of return and the rental
cost of housing nevertheless declines. To see this, note that since
(1—0)1 —it=(i—o)f'+ 'lix,




Since f",dk/drr andx are all negative, itseenat first as iftheeffect of






Using2.3 and 2. for Q1andQ2gives
d[(l_3)i—1TI
__________ = jo(l—y)f'+ nij—n(l+i)1x/Q1
dir
Since both x and are negative, thesignof d[(l—O)i--irl/dlI is the sameasthe
sign of
(2.9) =o(1—y)f'+onii —n(l+i.t).
The appendix shows that Q3isproportional to the change in wealth with respect to k
with h held constant: =(k-i-h+m)/k.The Partial Adjustment Assumption
di (i—O)i—iri
implies Q3<0 andtherefore,from 2.8,—_____ <0.
dir
Since the demand for housing is a function of the real irtherest rate,









Sinceall four terms are negative, dh/dii > 0. Note again that, tothe extent
that housing is also a function of real income and real income declines,this
1
will partially offset the value of dh/diT derived in 2.10.
1 At the conference at which this paper was presented, Penti Kouri suggested
considering a model in which saving is optimized in a Raimseymodel by indivi-
duals who live forever. In this case, the real net rate of return,(1—0) i—iT,
is fixed. This in turn means that r and therefore h are notinfluenced by
inflation. It follows, however, from equation i.L thatf' maist rise to keep
the right hand side constant; since f"<O, dlc/dir<0.In words, to earn the
same realnet return when inflation raises the effective tax rate,the pretax
return might increase.—23--
The final effect of inflation that I wish to examine is on total real
income, y +ph.If the initial allocation of capital between business and
housing were optimal, a small increase in inflation would leave real income
unchanged;this isan implication of the common proposition that any small
changefroman optimum involves no loss to a first order approximation. But if
taxes and inflation maketheinitial condition suboptimal, the rea11ocaiori of
capital caused by an increase in inflation will have a first order effect on
real income. More specifically, the very favorable tax treatment of owner—
occupied housing implies that even in the absence of inflation the real return
to marginal housing capital (p) is less than the return to business capital
(f'). A positive inflation rate widens the gap. This implies that a realloca-
tion of capital from the business sector causes a loss of real income. More
formally the change in real income induced by an inflation—induced change in the
allocation of capital is
( d(y+ph) h 2.ll ___________= ft +p
dir dir dir
Substituting from 2.5 and 2.10 implies
d(y+ph)
(2.11) __________= (Q3 - f'Q2)
dii Ql





Thus with f'>p, real income falls since '<0, x<0 and Qi<0.—21k—
3.Indexing the Tax Rules
Inflation causes a misallocation of capital between the business and
housing sectors because the tax laws mismeasure capital income and expenses.A
complete indexing of the tax laws would eliminate this source ofthe distortion
caused byinflation.Complete indexing has three aspects:(1) eliminating the
mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits that causes business
operating profits to be overstated; (2) limiting the deductionsfor business
interest to real interest payments only; and (3) limiting the taxation ofhouse-
hold interest income and expenses to the real interest rate. This sectionshows
the neutrality of inflation when all three of the features are presentand
examinesthe non—neutrality when there is only partialindexing.1
If firms pay tax rate 11onoperating profits net of real interest
expensesbut deduct the inflation component against their tax liability atrate
the firms' equilibrium condition (analogous to equation1.2) is
(3,1) (1-T1)f' +(1i1X)it =(1—T1)i+
Ifhouseholds are taxed on real interest receipts at rate Oand on the




cost of housing is the real net rate of interest plus the"other costs per unit
of housing capital" (z), the rental cost of hoasing is
(3.2) r=(l-01)i+ (81_02)it-+z
1Thesethree forms of indexing are discussed in Feldstein,Green and
Sheshinski (19T8) but there is no housing sector in thatmodel and all of the
distortions are in financial returns.
2Under existing law, '2 ='1;with complete indexing, '2 =o.—25—
and, using 3.1 to eliminate i,
(3.3) r =(1_81)ft+ (i-X) (T1-T2)
+ (01—02)ir—ii+ z
Whenthere is no indexing (i= andei=02),equation 3.3 reduces to the
sameimplicitrental cost that has already been analyzed. With complete
indexing(02=r2=A=O), equation 3.3 reduces to
(3.14) r =(i—01)f'+ z
Here the implicit rental price is independent of inflation.-
Itissometimes proposed that the elimination of historic costdepre-
ciation becoupled with limiting the business interest deduction to the real
cost of funds. In terms of equation 3.3, this implies X=T20 but 01= 02. The
resulting implicit rental cost of housing is then:





An increase in inflation reduces the implicit rental cost because the firm is
denied a deduction for the inflation premium inthe interest ratebut the house-
hold pays tax on that premium. An increase in the rate of inflation thus redu-
ces the.real net return to households on business capital and thereby lowers the
costof funds that enters the housing rental cost. Thus a partialindexing
1The allocation of capital still favors housing because the net services of
housing are not taxed while interest income is taxable and the mortgage
interest payments are deductible (Bi >0)but this is a separate matter.—'- —
approachthat focuses only on the firm mayexacerbatethe bias in favor of
housing that is caused by inflation and clearly does not leave an inflation—
neutral allocation of capital.
Most countries have dealt with inflation by accelerating the rate of
depreciation used for calculating taxable profits but without changing the tax
treatment of interest income and expenses. Accelerating depreciation has two
distinct effects. First, at any rate of inflation (including zero), this
lowers the effective tax rate on operating profits. In the notation of
equation 3.1, it is equivalent to increasing f'; note that it is not equivalent
to loweringT1sincethat would also affectthe tax treatment of interest.
Second, irorerapiddepreciation reduces the sensitivity of the tax to the rate
ofinflation, i.e., it lowers A. To see the effects of these changes on the
irlicitrental cost of housing, Iset T2= and02 =Oiin equation 3.3 and
evaluatethe total differential ofrwith respect to f'andA:
(3.6) dr=(l—0)df'—(l0)-riidA
(1—t)
The decrease inAraises the implicit rental cost of housing since it
reduces the excess tax on business capital caused by historic cost accounting
methods. Similarly the rise in f' raises the return on business investment
and thus directly increases the implicit rental cost of owner occupied housing.
Although full indexing avoids all of the tax induced distortions associatedwith
inflation, the right acceleration of depreciation can achieve the same effect
for anygiven rate of inflation.
1.Conclusion
Itis ironicthat an easy money policy aimed at stimulating investment
inplant and equipment is likely to have just the opposite effect: reducingthe—27—
long—run capital intensity of production. Whatever the short—run virtue of
expansionary policies, the long—run consequence of inflation under existing U.S.
tax laws is to reduce investors' demand for business capital and to increase it
for owner—occupied housing.
The simple model developed in this paper shows more generally how the
expectationof further inflation of the sort that resulted from the inflationary
experience of the1960'sand 1910's can have verysubstantialeffects on the
real economy. The notion •that a fully—anticipated monetary expansion or infla-
tion has no effect on the real econorr is not plausible in a modern econonr with
a complex set of tax rules. The specific effect of inflation will, moreover,
varyfrom country to country and from time to time as a function of the par-
ticular features of the country's fiscal structure.
It would be useful to extend the current analysis in a variety of
ways. Of particular interest would be replacing the debt—only assumption of
corporate finance with a mixture of debt and equity. This would bring out the
more limited significance of the corporate deductibility of nominal interest
payments and would show the relevance of the taxation of nominal capital gains.
A further (or alternative) extension to include interest bearing government debt
as well as money would be of interest because this would permit the government
to vary the real interest rate through its debt management policy and would show
the effect of inflation on residential investment when low—risk government debt
is an alternative asset. Finally, since the analysis here is limited to U.S.
tax rules, it would be quite interesting to see it altered to describe the tax
rules of other countries and used to analyze the effect of inflation in these
settings.—28—
The present model, either in its current formorwith the extensions
described above, could be the basis for a more explicit dynamicanalysisof the
transitionpath when the expected rate of inflation changes. This in turn
would provide a sounder foundation for the empirical analysis of the effect of




This appendix discusses the relation of Q1, Q2 and of section 2 to
the disequilibrium adjustment process and to the stability conditions of the
model.
Combining equations 1.13 and 1.114 yields
(A.l) oj(l—y)(y+ph) + =+ _L+SM/p)
N N N
It follows directly from differentiating k with respect to time that
(A.2) k +nk.
N
Similarly H/N =h +nhand (M/p)/N =in+nm.Thus A.l can be rewritten
(A.3) [(1—y)(y+ph) +nml =n[k+h+m)+k+h+m
Alongabalanced growth path, k =h=m=0and this condition was
imposed for the analysis in the text. But when k, h or in and not at their
equilibrium values, these ratios will change to bring about equilibrium.
By substituting ii =4and m =u(k+h),equation A.3 can be rewritten:
(A.14)[(i—y)(f+p) +n(k+)1—n(l+)(k+)=k+h+m





Similarly thederivativeof A.2 with respect to h yields
(A.7) [(l—y)p +np}—n(l+ii) d(k +h+m)/dh
or
(A.8) =d(k+h+m)/dh.
The net adjustment assumptions (1.19 and 1.20) imply directly that Q1<0and
<0.
To derive the interpretation of of equation 2.9, take the partial








The partial adjusted assumption (1.21) implies that <0.—31—
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